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Just Molly and Me and Baby Makes
Three - Or Does It?
Child Custody and the Live-In Lover: An
Empirical Study
Donald H. Stonet
I. Introduction
How do judges confronted with a parent living with a per-
son of the opposite sex, outside of marriage, view such a rela-
tionship when child custody is at issue? Can a mother continue
living with her boyfriend under the same roof as her children
when a father seeks custody? Is a child adversely affected by a
parent living in open and continuous cohabitation? When cus-
tody is an issue, do attorneys counsel cohabiting parents against
continuing their relationships with their lovers? Do regional
moral values or an individual judge's personal values have a dis-
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proportionate effect on the outcome of a custody dispute? What
factors do judges consider when making custody awards? Many
of these questions arise in cases involving custody disputes when
a parent cohabits with a lover. This Article will analyze how at-
torneys advise cohabiting parents and how courts confronted
with a mother or father living with a person other than their
spouse without the benefit of marriage, or with a parent who
commits adultery on one or two isolated occasions, resolve such
custody disputes.
As a result of the enormous increase in the number of di-
vorces in the United States, judges are confronted with more
custody litigation than ever before. In the 1970s, the number of
divorces doubled, surpassing one million per year.' During the
1980s, family breakups occurred at a rate of 1.2 million per
year.2 Recent projections indicate that 51.6% of present mar-
riages will eventually end in divorce.3 Other predictions suggest
that the divorce rate may reach an even higher level." Because
one half of divorcing couples have children, the number of chil-
dren involved in divorce has more than tripled in the past two
decades. 5 Recent census data show that over one in four chil-
dren, representing 15.3 million children nationally, live in single
parent homes.8
Society has gone to great lengths to protect and promote
the integrity of the traditional family.' To this end, children are
1. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
VICES, SERIES 3, No. 19, NATIONAL ESTIMATES OF MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION AND SURVIVOR-
SHIP: UNITED STATES (1980); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-
23, No. 84, DIVORCE, CHILD, CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT (1979).
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS RE-
PORT, Vol. 38, No. 12, Supp. 2, at 7 (May 15, 1990).
3. According to a study conducted by James Weed of the U.S. National Center for
Health Statistics using 1985 data, it is projected that 51.6% of the marriages which be-
gan in 1985 will end in divorce. The Life of a Marriage, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS, Feb.
1989, at 12.
4. H. DAVIDSON & K. GERLACH, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 233 (1984).
5. Weitzman, Changing Families, Changing Laws, 5 FAM. ADVOC. 5 (1982). Accord-
ing to 1987 data obtained from the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, 52% of
the divorcing couples in 1987 had children. MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT, supra
note 2, at 10.
6. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-20, No. 433, MARITAL
STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: March, 1988 at 61 (1989).
7. The parent-child relationship has been cherished and highly. protected by the
courts because of the importance of the family unit in our society. In 1923, the United
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removed from loving and caring parents who cohabit with lovers.
Some courts have removed children from a cohabiting parent
because of the fear of potential harm to them. Other courts have
used their power to modify custody determinations in order to
punish a parent for their moral indiscretions. A review of appel-
late decisions involving custody disputes shows that mothers
who live with a lover have a significantly greater chance of losing
custody of their children than do fathers in a similar situation.8
The fact that divorce creates financial hardship for many
women9 may lead them to choose to live with a man for financial
security.
Do courts exercise a double standard, being more forgiving
of a father's adulterous activity than that of a mother's? Is soci-
ety more forgiving of a man's moral shortcomings than a wo-
man's? It is extremely rare for a court to remove children from, a
parent who lives in open cohabitation based on the testimony of
an expert who articulates specific, concrete evidence of harm to
the child.' 0 Part of the problem lies in the fact that judges hear-
ing custody cases are given wide discretionary authority to inter-
pret "the best interest of the child.""
The empirical data contained in this Article is submitted to
serve as a backdrop for purposes of elaboration and comparison.
States Supreme Court explored parents' rights to the custody, care, control, maintenance
and companionship of their children, and held that an individual's right to marry and
raise children was a fundamental liberty protected against all but compelling state inter-
ests. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1971) ("The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection."). The traditional nuclear family has retained its place of primary
importance in American culture as we enter the last decade of the twentieth century.
8. See infra notes 164-85 and accompanying text.
9. See generally McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Di-
vorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L. Q. 351 (1987).
10. There are no definitive psychological studies on what effect a custodial parent's
cohabitation has on a child. Note, Custody and the Cohabiting Parent, 20 J. FAM. L. 697,
713 (1981-82).
11. A review of child custody statutes reveals that courts are to apply the best inter-
est standard. For example, the North Carolina child custody statute provides: "An order
for custody ... awarded ... as will best promote the interest and welfare of the child."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1987). The Arkansas child custody statute states: "The award
of custody ... in accordance with the welfare and best interests of the children." ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 9-13-101 (1987). For a review of state custody statutes see infra notes 217,
219-22.
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Eighty-one attorneys from across the country were surveyed to
elicit their opinions on these and other questions relating to
child custody.' The attorneys surveyed have litigated custody
cases in a majority of the states in this nation and their re-
sponses are compared by region.13 The responses of male and
female attorneys are tabulated and compared, and demonstrate
a statistical significance between the gender of lawyers and their
responses to many of the questions in the survey.1' Additionally,
the responses are compared and contrasted by the ages of the
participating attorneys. 15 Cases in the area of child custody are
analyzed by dividing them into two categories: first, the per se
category and second, the nexus between a parent's behavior and
the effect on the child. Finally, a model statute addressing the
factors a court should consider in adjudicating a custody dispute
is presented.
II. Statistical Review of Custody Awards
Custody disputes are settled prior to trial in a significant
number of cases. Approximately 70% of custody cases are re-
solved outside of court, while only 30% of cases are contested
and reach final adjudication (see Graph 1).16
12. D. Stone, Custody Survey (June 1988) reproduced at Appendix A. The empirical
study included a twelve page questionnaire sent to attorneys throughout the country who
represent parents in child custody hearings. All of the attorneys surveyed were members
of the American Bar Association's Custody Committee. Eighty-one attorneys, who have
handled over 1,200 cases between June 1, 1987 and May 31, 1988, responded to the sur-
vey. D. Stone, Responses to Custody Survey.
13. Id. The Custody Survey encompassed 36 states and the District of Columbia.
The data is divided among five regions, namely: Northeast (Connecticut, Maryland, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington, D.C.); Southeast (Flor-
ida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia); North-
Central (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin); South-
Central (Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas); and West
(Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Washing-
ton, and Wyoming).
14. See Graphs 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, and 19. Of those responding to the Custody
Survey, 41% were women and 59% were men.
15. See Graphs 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, and 19. The average age of the attorneys re-
sponding to the Custody Survey was forty years. Comparisons were made between attor-
neys under the age of forty and those over forty. The respondents possess an average of
twelve years of practical experience.
16. The South-Central region settled fewer custody cases than any other at a rate of
approximately 65%. See Graph 1. One reason for this might be shorter court dockets,
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss1/1
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Mothers are awarded custody of their children in a majority
of the cases. In custody disputes that are resolved out of court,
mothers are awarded custody in 61% of the cases, while fathers
receive custody only 15% of the time. Joint custody is awarded
in approximately 21% of the cases (see Graph 2).
Male attorneys and attorneys under the age of forty settled
custody cases at a slightly higher rate than both female attor-
neys and attorneys over the age of forty. Significantly, male at-
torneys are more successful in securing custody awards for
mothers than are female attorneys (see Graph 2).17
In the South-Central region, mothers lead fathers in cus-
tody awards in settled cases, at a rate of 72% to 20%. The
Southeastern region follows closely behind, with mothers receiv-
ing custody awards in approximately 65% of the cases settled
out of court and fathers receiving custody 20% of the time (see
HOW ULTIMATE OUTCOMES OF
CUSTODY CASES ARE REACHED
70% -
50%
40%-
20%-
0%_07
SETTLED PRIOR ADJUDICATED SETTLED WITHOUT
TO HEARING FILING
REGIONS
NORTHEAST SOUTHEAST NORTH CENTRAL
SSOUTH CENTRAL= WEST
GRAPH 1
resulting in less waiting time for a custody hearing to be held.
17. Male attorneys prevail in 66% of the disputes, while female attorneys succeed
55% of the time. See Graph 2.
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Graph 3). Mothers in the West also receive custody in settled
cases at higher rates than do fathers (see Graph 3).1 8
Joint custody awards are less favored. The West, with 22%,
is the area of the nation with the highest percentage of joint cus-
tody dispositions in settled cases. Parents in the Southeast are
the least likely to accept joint custody as the final resolution,
accepting such a disposition in only 13% of the cases (see Graph
3).
In custody cases that go to trial, mothers receive custody of
their children in even greater numbers than they do in cases
that are settled. 9 Judges seem to be less willing to make joint
custody awards than do negotiating attorneys, possibly because
judges demand that parents demonstrate an amicable relation-
ship. Another reason why courts resist recommending joint cus-
tody arrangements in contested cases is that courts more often
witness the failure of such arrangements. Failures are presented
to courts for resolution; success stories are not.
The courts of the North-Central region appear to be the
most receptive to mothers seeking custody, awarding them cus-
tody of their children in over 80% of contested cases. Neverthe-
less, while courts in all regions of the country continue to award
custody to mothers in greater numbers than to fathers, the
Northeast may reflect a growing trend. Northeastern courts
favor mothers over fathers at a rate of only 50% to 26%, with
joint custody accounting for the remaining 24% (see Graph 5).
Attorneys who are forty years of age or older appear to be
more successful in obtaining custody of children for the mother
in contested cases, at a rate of 66%, compared to attorneys
under forty, who obtain custody only 52% of the time. Similarly,
female attorneys are more successful in obtaining custody for
mothers in contested cases, at a rate of 65%, compared to 55%
for male attorneys (see Graph 4). Therefore, one could conclude
that a mother seeking custody of her children in a contested
hearing will be more successful with a female or older attorney.
18. The gap is narrowing slightly, however, with mothers leading fathers 58% to
18%. See Graph 3.
19. In this scenario mothers prevail 65% of the time, with fathers being awarded
custody in 29% of the cases. Joint custody is deemed appropriate in 6% of the cases. See
Graph 4.
[Vol. 11:1
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Data collected from a variety of sources indicate that
mothers continue to be awarded custody more frequently than
fathers. Two surveys demonstrated that mothers received cus-
tody at a rate of 85%20 and 60%21 respectively. In contrast, a
review of 241 appellate custody cases conducted by the Family
Law Quarterly,22 found custody awards to mothers in only 49%
of the cases and to fathers in 51% of the cases (see Graph 6). A
possible explanation for this inconsistency is that this data does
not take into account the fact that the majority of custody cases
are settled without a trial. As has been documented, mothers are
awarded custody of their children in a majority of settled cases
(see Graph 6), a fact not accounted for in the study. Addition-
ally, fathers may be more likely than mothers to appeal trial
court decisions, due in part to financial considerations.2 3
DISPOSITION OF CASES AND FREQUENCY WITH
WHICH EACH PARENT IS AWARDED CUSTODY
90%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
TO MOTHER TO FATHER JOINT CUSTODY OTHER
CUSTODY DECISION
CONNECTICUT SURVEY PRIOR SETTLEMENT
JUDGE DECISION APP. COURT DECISION
The first 2 columns correspond to our survey. The last 2
correspond to 1982 and 1984 surveys reported in Family Law Quarterly.
GRAPH 6
20. McLindon, supra note 9, at 367.
21. See Graph 6.
22. Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate
Court, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 8-11 (1984).
23. Many women experience a substantial decrease in their post-divorce income.
McLindon, supra note 9, at 392.
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A. Influence of the Attorney's Age and Gender on Advice
Given to Clients
Because of the overwhelming numbers of custody cases that
never go to trial, it is important to focus on the advice that at-
torneys offer clients who disclose that they are living with a
lover. Does this advice vary depending on whether it is the
mother living with a boyfriend or the father living with a girl-
friend? Does the attorney's age or sex influence the advice
given? Does the region of the country influence the advice of-
fered by the attorney?
Attorneys surveyed advise a father with a live-in girlfriend
to marry in 13% of the cases; the advice to "kick out" the lover
is offered in 9% of the cases. Attorneys are slightly less likely to
recommend marriage to the mother with a live-in boyfriend, of-
fering it in 9% of the cases; the advice to "kick out" the lover is
also offered in 9% of the cases (see Graphs 7 and 8).
ATTORNEY'S ADVICE TO CLIENT FATHER
WHEN COHABITING WITH FEMALE
MARRY FEMALE ASK FEMALE REFUSE TO
TO MOVE OUT REPRESENT
OVERALL MALES
ATTORNEY <40 ATTORNEY >40
GRAPH 7
OTHER
FEMALES
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ATTORNEY'S ADVICE TO CLIENT MOTHER
WHEN COHABITING WITH MALE
90%--
80%-
70%-
60%
50%
40%
30%
MARRY MALE ASK MALE REFUSE TO
TO MOVE OUT REPRESENT
OTHER
m OVERALL MALES FEMALES
ATTORNEY <40 ATTORNEY >40
GRAPH 8
Female attorneys are much more likely to take an interven-
tionist role, advising their client to marry or "kick out" his
lover.24 Even more remarkable is that female attorneys advise
the father with a live-in girlfriend to "kick out" his lover in
15.6% of the cases, while male attorneys offer this advice to fa-
thers only 4.5% of the time (see Graph 7). When the client is a
mother with a live-in boyfriend, female attorneys again are more
outspoken in their advice. Female attorneys advise a mother
with a live-in boyfriend to marry 12.9% of the time as compared
to male attorneys who provide the same advice 6.8% of the time.
Similarly, female attorneys advise the mother to "kick out" her
lover in almost four times as many cases as male attorneys (see
Graph 8).28 Female attorneys also appear more likely to tell a
24. Female attorneys advise a father with a live-in girlfriend to marry 18.8% of the
time, while only 9.1% of male attorneys give such advice. See Graph 7.
25. 16% and 4.5% respectively.
1990]
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father to marry than to tell a mother to marry.2 Perhaps this
result is due to a recognition on the part of female attorneys
that fathers are less likely to be awarded custody."1 Hence, regu-
larizing the father's marital status may remove at least one
stumbling block to gaining custody of his children.
In comparing advice offered by attorneys under the age of
forty with that offered by attorneys over forty, older attorneys
are more likely to refuse to represent a client who admits to co-
habiting with a lover."' Younger attorneys are more likely to ad-
vise fathers rather than mothers to marry, at a rate of 15.6%
and 9.7% respectively (see Graphs 7 and 8).
B. Regional Influence on Advice Given to Clients
A review of the survey data by region shows significant pat-
terns. In the Southeast, both male and female attorneys recom-
mend that their client "kick out" his or her lover in 37.5% of the
cases. In 50% of the cases in the Southeast, attorneys will advise
that the lover either be kicked out or will simply refuse to re-
present the client (see Graphs 9 and 10). This advice appears
sound when reviewing how Southern judges rule when con-
fronted with a cohabiting parent. 9 What is remarkable is that
half of the attorneys in the Southeast would agree to represent
the client without advising the client to "kick out" the lover. In
contrast, no attorney surveyed in the Western region would ei-
ther refuse to represent such a client or advise that the lover be
kicked out (see Graphs 9 and 10).
The advice from attorneys to "marry your lover" is never
offered in the Southeast, while in the North-Central region it is
given in many cases.30 A possible explanation is that courts in
the North-Central region appear to believe that a marriage li-
cense cures a parent's moral shortcomings.1 In essence, to
26. 18.8% and 12.9% respectively.
27. See Graph 6.
28. This occurs in 6.7% of the cases. See Graphs 7 and 8.
29. See infra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
30. 35.7% of the attorneys surveyed recommend marriage to fathers and 23.1% rec-
ommend marriage to mothers. See Graphs 9 and 10.
31. See Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Il. App. 3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70 (1978); Greenfield v.
Greenfield, 199 Neb. 648, 260 N.W.2d 493 (1977); Lapp v. Lapp, 336 N.W.2d 350 (N.D.
1983); Wyss v. Wyss, 3 Ohio App. 3d 412, 445 N.E.2d 1153 (1982).
[Vol. 11:1
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accommodate their perception of what is socially acceptable be-
havior for parents, judges have engaged in a form of social engi-
neering. The concept of a parent running to the justice of the
peace prior to a custody hearing to pacify an outraged judge has
far-reaching implications.
Do courts confronted with a parent cohabiting with a lover
view such a living arrangement, in and of itself, to be enough to
warrant removing children from the home, or does it depend on
the effect the living arrangement has on the welfare of the child?
Approximately 12% of the attorneys believe that a parent's co-
habitation with a lover, standing alone, is a sufficient ground for
a court to remove custody from that parent. Attorneys age forty
and over are twice as likely as younger attorneys to conclude
that judges, without any evidence of harm to the child, would
remove children from their father simply because of his cohabi-
tation. Their advice to their clients reflects this perspective.
CUSTODY DISPOSITION BY COURT
WHEN FATHER COHABITING WITH FEMALE
90% -
80% .
70% .
60% .
50% .
40%
30% .
20%
0%
MINOR FACTOR REMOVE CHILD DETERMINE EFFECTS
WEIGHT GIVEN TO LIVING ARRANGEMENT
OVERALL L MALES FEMALES
ATTORNEY <40 E ATTORNEY >40
ACCORDING TO ATTORNEY
GRAPH 11
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A regional review of the survey data most clearly evidences
a significant variation in the way courts address a parent's co-
habitation in the custody context. In the Southeast, courts con-
sider a father's living with a woman without the benefit of mar-
riage as per se unfitness in 50% of the cases. When considering a
mother with a live-in boyfriend, Southeastern courts are slightly
more lenient, but still consider cohabitation, even without evi-
dence of harm to the child, as per se unfitness in 40% of the
cases. By comparison, courts of the Northeastern and Western
regions never consider the parent's cohabitation a per se show-
ing of unfitness (see Graphs 13 and 14). The variation between
the Southeastern and the Western regions may be a reflection of
community standards. On the other hand, courts may lag behind
the times in reflecting community norms. Parents of minor chil-
dren are cohabiting in all regions of the country."2 In the custody
32. Note, Recognizing Contract and Property Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants in
Wisconsin: Watts v. Watts, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 1093, 1093 n.1 (1988).
1990]
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context, perhaps the courts should take their heads out of the
sand, look and listen to their communities, and determine
whether such living arrangements are harmful to children.
Attorneys in custody disputes play a vital role in shaping
the behavior of those parents who choose to live with a lover
outside of marriage. Parents involved in such a living arrange-
ment continue to face a challenge to retain custody of their
children. Often, non-custodial parents use these relationships to
seek removal of custody. Therefore, during the initial attorney-
client interview, when it is revealed that the custodial parent is
living with a lover, the attorney is immediately thrust into a po-
sition of influencing the client's future living arrangement. Du-
ring attorney-client counseling, should the lawyer recommend
marriage, or should he recommend that the lover be asked to
leave the house, or, if both these alternatives are rejected, should
the attorney refuse to represent the client?
According to one Tennessee attorney,"s judges confronted
with a parent seeking custody while living with a lover consider
the parent's living arrangement as per se unfitness and remove
the child from that parent's home. Recognizing the Tennessee
courts' position on this matter, attorneys advise their clients to
either get married or remove the lover from the home. 4 In con-
trast, one New York attorney handling custody cases claims he
has no right or duty to tell a client to marry. In fact, if the boy-
friend is of good character, he may "be an asset by providing a
constant fatherly figure."3 5 A California attorney, stating that
"our courts do not get involved in the morality of the situation,"
claims that the Los Angeles County Superior Court is the "best
place for a parent to litigate a custody case because the court
will not show any interest in her private life."3 6
33. D. Stone, Responses to Custody Survey. Attorneys from the Southeast region
(Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia) re-
ported that in 50% of child custody cases courts consider a parent living with a lover
outside of marriage to be per se unfit. See Graphs 13 and 14.
34. D. Stone, Responses to Custody Survey.
35. Id.
36. Id. Attorneys from the Western region of the United States (Alaska, California,
Colorado, Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming)
reported that their courts never consider a parent living with a lover outside of marriage
to be per se unfit. See Graphs 13 and 14.
1990]
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III. Review of Court Custody Decisions
Courts throughout the country have been confronted with
the difficult issue of child custody when a parent openly and
continuously cohabits with a lover. While some courts have side-
stepped the fundamental question of whether such a living ar-
rangement is harmful to the child, other courts have directly ad-
dressed this issue. Two approaches have been used by judges in
awarding custody in such a situation. When the "per se" ap-
proach is applied, the fact that a parent cohabits with a lover
outside of marriage will lead to a conclusive presumption by the
court that custody should be removed from that parent. The
second method of review articulated by the courts is the "nexus"
approach, whereby the court scrutinizes whether there exists
tangible and concrete evidence of a present adverse effect on the
child. Under this approach, only if the court finds such evidence
is custody removed from the cohabiting parent.
A. The Per Se Category
Courts following the per se standard of evaluation have held
that a cohabiting parent should automatically lose custody of his
or her children, even in the absence of tangible evidence of an
adverse effect on the child. These courts cite different considera-
tions to reach this conclusion, including peer teasing," poor role
modeling,"8 moral climate,3" and lack of marriage plans."
In Jarrett v. Jarrett,41 the Illinois Supreme Court had to
determine who should receive custody of three children, ages
seven, ten and twelve, whose mother cohabited with her lover in
37. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 349, 400 N.E.2d 421, 426 (1979) (the court was
concerned that the children might be forced to explain their mother's lover to friends
and to "endure their taunts and jibes") cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980).
38. Beck v. Beck, 341 So. 2d 580, 582 (La. App. 1977) (children learn behavior by
example, particularly from their parents).
39. Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 199, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1977) (the court noted that
"the moral climate in which children are to be raised is an important consideration.. . in
determining custody .... ").
40. Hicks v. Hicks, 214 Neb. 588, 590, 334 N.W.2d 807, 809 (1983) (the fact that the
cohabiting mother had no marriage plans was an important consideration); see also
Batenhorst v. Batenhorst, 205 Neb. 601, 288 N.W.2d 740 (1980) (the attitude and stabil-
ity of character of each parent is among the many factors to be considered in determin-
ing the best interest of the child).
41. 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980).
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the family home without any plan to marry."2 The central issue
was whether custody should be removed from the mother based
on her open and ongoing cohabitation without a finding of a pre-
sent adverse effect upon the children. The father of the children
sought custody based on the theory that the current living ar-
rangement would result in future harm to the children.
In this case, Jacqueline Jarrett had been granted a divorce
from her husband, Walter Jarrett, on the grounds of extreme
and repeated mental cruelty.'3 The court found that Jacqueline
was a fit and proper person and awarded her custody of the
three children. Approximately five months later, her lover
moved into the home." Upon learning of this, her ex-husband
petitioned the circuit court of Cook County for modification of
custody, stating that "Jacqueline's living arrangement was con-
trary to his own personal beliefs . . . and an improper moral
climate."'"
Granting his petition, the trial court stated that it was "ne-
cessary for the moral and spiritual well-being and development"
of the children that they reside with their father.'6 The court
heard no evidence regarding an adverse effect on the children as
a result of their mother's living arrangement. 7 Despite an ab-
sence of evidence that the mother was an unfit parent, the trial
court concluded that the relationship "constitute[d] such a dis-
regard for community standards as to endanger her children's
moral well-being."' 8 The trial court awarded Walter Jarrett cus-
tody of his three children.
The appellate court of Illinois reversed, concluding that
there was no evidence to support a finding that Jacqueline was
42. Id. at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 422 (the mother did not want to remarry because she
did not believe her relationship needed to be formalized and because the divorce decree
required her to sell the family home within six months after remarriage).
43. Id. at 340-41, 400 N.E.2d at 421.
44. Id. at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 422.
45. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 64 I1. App. 3d 932, 934, 382 N.E.2d 12, 14 (1978), rev'd, 78 111.
2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980).
46. Id. at 935, 382 N.E.2d at 14 (quoting the trial court opinion).
47. Id. at 937, 382 N.E.2d at 16. The appellate court noted that in the absence of
any evidence of negative effects, it would decline to indulge in speculation as to what
effects might possibly "raise their ugly heads" at some future time. Id. at 937, 382
N.E.2d at 16 (quoting Gehn v. Gehn, 51 Ill. App. 3d 946, 949, 367 N.E.2d 508, 511
(1977)).
48. Jarrett, 64 Ill. App. 3d at 936, 382 N.E.2d at 15.
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an unfit parent.' 9 The court noted that Jacqueline Jarrett,
Wayne Hammon and the three children functioned as a family
unit.50 According to the court, the relationship between Jacque-
line and Wayne was not relevant absent proof of a negative ef-
fect on the children. The appellate court refused to enter the
battle regarding the morality of the mother's living arrangement,
choosing instead to focus on the welfare and best interest of the
children. The appellate court additionally held that the trial
court abused its discretion when it imposed its own standard of
moral fitness without any evidence on the record of harm to the
welfare of the children. 1
In what was to become a leading per se decision, the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that exposing the children
to Jacqueline's living arrangement was harmful to their moral
well-being and development.2 Jacqueline's continued cohabita-
tion with Wayne Hammon, in the absence of any indication that
the relationship would cease in the future, was critical to the
court's decision. Had Jacqueline expressed her intention to
marry Wayne Hammon, the court very likely would have per-
mitted the children to remain with their mother. The court dis-
tinguished custody cases where the cohabiting mother planned
to marry 3 from cases where there was no future plan to marry.
The Jarrett court had previously held that past moral indiscre-
tions of a parent were insufficient grounds for denying custody if
the present conduct did not indicate a continuation of such be-
havior in the future."' But the Jarrett case challenged the court
49. Id. at 937, 382 N.E.2d at 16.
50. Hammon disciplined the children, helped them with homework, and played with
them. Id.
51. Id.; see also Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 49 Ill. App. 3d 160, 364 N.E.2d 566
(1977) (custody will not be changed unless it is established that change in circumstances
renders modification in the best interests of the children).
52. The court supported the trial court's conclusion that the presence of Jacqueline
and Hammon together with the children was injurious to the moral well-being and devel-
opment of the children. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d at 347, 400 N.E.2d at 424.
53. See Burris v. Burris, 70 Ill. App. 3d 503, 388 N.E.2d 811 (1979); In re Marriage
of Farris, 69 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 388 N.E.2d 232 (1979); Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App. 3d
465, 381 N.E.2d 70 (1978). Jacqueline Jarrett relied on these cases, arguing that the
moral indiscretion of a parent is insufficient grounds for denial of custody. Jarrett, 78 Ill.
2d at 348, 400 N.E.2d at 425.
54. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d at 347, 400 N.E.2d at 424 (quoting Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408,
415, 105 N.E.2d 300, 303 (1952)).
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to extend its prior ruling in Nye v. Nye55 and to hold that past
and present moral indiscretions of a parent are not sufficient
grounds to deny custody. The court was unwilling to make such
a leap. According to the court, Jacqueline's disregard for com-
munity standards of conduct sent the clear message that her
children, too, could choose to ignore them." The focus of the
court's concern, was that the moral values Jacqueline was por-
traying to her children would have a negative effect on their fu-
ture behavior.57
The court in Jarrett rejected a requirement for tangible evi-
dence of harm to the children.58 Interpreting the state custody
statute" to support its conclusion, the court explained that it
was not necessary to wait and see if harm actually occurred.
Rather, the potential for endangering a child's physical, mental,
moral or emotional health was sufficient to justify removal of the
children.60 The court believed that open cohabitation adversely
affects the mental and emotional health of children.6 1 The flaw
in the court's reasoning was its failure to require concrete evi-
dence of present harm. The court failed to offer any psychologi-
cal or sociological basis for its conclusion that children are
harmed when exposed to a parent living with a lover. Further-
more, the record was completely devoid of expert psychological
testimony identifying the existence of actual harm to Jacque-
line's children. The court itself hinted at this concern when it
55. 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952) (held that past moral indiscretions of a pa-
rent are insufficient grounds for denying custody if the parent's present conduct estab-
lishes the improbability of such lapses in the future). In Jarrett, the mother indicated
she had no intention of terminating the relationship with her lover. 78 Ill. 2d at 347, 400
N.E.2d at 424.
56. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d at 346, 400 N.E.2d at 424; see also Stark v. Stark, 13 Ill. App.
3d 35, 299 N.E.2d 605 (1973); Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 237 S.E.2d 89 (1977).
57. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d at 346-47, 400 N.E.2d at 424-25.
58. Id.; see also Vincent v. Vincent, 420 So. 2d 1333 (La. App. 1982) (although
mother saw nothing wrong with living with a man, the court found it to be a serious and
damaging influence on the proper upbringing of a two and one-half year old child and
declared the mother unfit).
59. Section 610 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act directs trial
courts to determine whether the child's present environment endangers seriously his
physical, mental, moral or emotional health. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 610 (Smith-
Hurd 1977).
60. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d at 344, 400 N.E.2d at 423.
61. Id. at 349, 400 N.E.2d at 425.
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noted that it was difficult to predict what psychological effect
the mother's cohabitation would have on the children.
62
The majority distinguished its conclusion from the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Stanley v. Illinois,6" explain-
ing that it had closely scrutinized the individual facts of the
case, and did not draw a conclusive presumption depriving all
mothers who cohabit with a lover of custody of their children. It
based its conclusion upon the fact that cohabitation was consid-
ered a misdemeanor in Illinois." The infringement of the Illinois
fornication statute65 violated the expressed moral standards of
the state and encouraged others to violate those standards as
well. 6 This violation of moral standards was sufficient justifica-
tion to conclude that the children were adversely affected even
in the absence of specific findings of harm to the children.
This case drew two strongly worded dissents. The first
found the children healthy, well adjusted and cared for and
pointed out that neither the trial nor appellate courts had found
the mother to be unfit. 7 The second dissent firmly expressed its
position by stating: "[N]ot one scintilla of actual or statistical
evidence of harm or danger to the children has been presented.
To the contrary, . . . the children's welfare and needs were
met."68
As both the dissents in Jarrett and Justice Brennan's dis-
sent to the United States Supreme Court decision denying cer-
tiorari concluded, there was no basis for presuming that Jacque-
line's cohabitation would adversely affect her children. 9
62. Id. at 349, 400 N.E.2d at 426; see also Gehn v. Gehn, 51 111. App. 3d 946, 949,
367 N.E.2d 508, 511 (1977) (the court noted the difficulty in presenting objective evi-
dence of the future effect of such conduct).
63. 405 U.S. 645 (1971) (the Supreme Court invalidated a conclusive presumption
that an unwed father is unfit to exercise custody over his children).
64. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d at 337, 400 N.E.2d at 421.
65. Section 11-8 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that "[a]ny person who co-
habits or has sexual intercourse with another not his spouse commits fornication if the
behavior is open and notorious." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-8 (Smith-Hurd 1977).
66. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d at 346, 400 N.E.2d at 424.
67. Id. at 351, 400 N.E.2d at 426 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 352, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Moran, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the
majority used the seldom enforced fornication statute and utilized child custody as a
vehicle to punish Jacqueline for her "misconduct." Id. at 352-53, 400 N.E.2d at 427.
69. 449 U.S. 927, 931 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 70-71 and
accompanying text.
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Justice Brennan recognized Stanley for what it stood for,
that the interests of parents in the companionship, care, custody
and management of their children "cannot be determined by the
evidentiary shortcut of a conclusive presumption. '70 The United
States Supreme Court prohibited custody modification based on
a conclusive presumption of a serious adverse effect on the chil-
dren's best interest. According to Justice Brennan, the Jarrett
court followed this same logic by concluding that Jacqueline Jar-
rett's living arrangement, alone, caused an adverse effect on the
well-being and development of her children, and thus rendered
her an unfit parent.7
1
The Jarrett case is by no means the only case standing for
the proposition that a parent who openly cohabits with a lover
will lose custody of the children. In Hicks v. Hicks,7 the Ne-
braska Supreme Court upheld a custody award of a four year old
daughter to her father because the mother was living with a man
in a "frequent and continuous manner." Acknowledging that
adultery cannot, as a matter of law, deprive a parent of cus-
tody,73 the court nevertheless pointed out that it is hardly a
"recommendation tending to prove fitness. ' 74 The Hicks court
went to great lengths to point out that the mother had no plans
to marry her lover. 75 However, the court stopped short of saying
that all would be forgiven were the parties to marry.
In Gibson v. Pierce,7 the Georgia court of appeals found
that the remarriage of a cohabiting mother does not cure all ills.
Nancy Gibson and James Pierce were divorced in March, 1984.
Custody of their three-year old daughter was awarded to Nancy.
Two months later, James petitioned the court for custody modi-
fication, claiming that on several occasions in May of 1984,
Nancy's boyfriend had spent the night in her home while the
child was present. Nancy married her boyfriend, David Gibson,
70. 449 U.S. at 930 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. 214 Neb. 588, 334 N.W.2d 807 (1983).
73. Id. at 590, 334 N.W.2d at 809.
74. Id. The court explained that "moral fitness and conduct of the parties ... are of
great significance in determining questions of custody." Id.; see also Koch v. Koch, 209
Neb. 896, 312 N.W.2d 294 (1981).
75. Hicks, 214 Neb. at 590, 334 N.W.2d at 809.
76. 176 Ga. App. 287, 335 S.E.2d 658 (1985), cert. denied, 255 Ga. 525, 342 S.E.2d
467 (1986).
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in August of 1984, two months before the custody hearing.7"
Despite the formalization of the relationship, the court was
not persuaded to allow Nancy to retain custody. The court of
appeals of Georgia focused, as in Jarrett, on the state's criminal
fornication statute.7 8 Admitting that the trial court relied on
findings of fact that were "somewhat scanty," the court, none-
theless, removed custody of the child from her mother.7  The
court heard no evidence nor reached any conclusion that Nancy
and her future husband "engaged in [any] inappropriate con-
duct in the presence of the child . . . ."80 Nor did the court find
any adverse effect to the well being of the minor child. Instead,
evidence that Nancy and her fianc6 had spent several nights to-
gether was found by the court to warrant a material change af-
fecting the welfare of the child. 1
Another important per se case was Brown v. Brown,82 de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Brown court found
that an otherwise fit parent, by reason of an adulterous relation-
ship in the same home where her two sons resided, was not the
proper person to have the care and custody of the children.8
Using the presumption that because children learn by example
they must be harmed by such a relationship, 8 the court side-
stepped identifying any evidence of direct harm to the children.
The evidence presented showed that Mrs. Brown properly cared
for her children and her home,83 but the court focused its atten-
tion solely on the relationship between Mrs. Brown and her
lover.86
77. Id. at 287, 335 S.E.2d at 658.
78. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (1988).
79. Gibson, 176 Ga. App. at 287, 335 S.E.2d at 659.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 218 Va. 196, 237 S.E.2d 89 (1977).
83. Id. at 200, 237 S.E.2d at 92.
84. Id. at 199, 237 S.E.2d at 91; see also Beck v. Beck, 341 So. 2d 580, 582 (La. Ct.
App. 1977) (mother's adulterous relationship rendered her unfit to have custody);
Denton v. Meshell, 335 So. 2d 705, 706 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (mother living in open adul-
tery held unfit to have custody).
85. Brown, 218 Va. at 198, 237 S.E.2d at 91.
86. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court remarked that the lower court "was only inter-
ested in hearing testimony on the relationship between Mrs. Brown and Leith." Id. at
198, 237 S.E.2d at 91.
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The court of appeals of Louisiana in Sherman v. Sherman,87
followed the per se standard adopted by several courts in the
Southeastern United States. In this case, Mrs. Sherman admit-
ted frequently sleeping with a man, but denied doing so in the
presence of her three-year old son.88 However, because the
mother and her lover did not have separate residences, the court
concluded that "their arrangement amounted to concubinage."
89
The court of appeals of Louisiana distinguished Sherman from
Cleeton v. Cleeton,90 where a mother and her lover had main-
tained separate residences and only occasionally stayed together
overnight. Apparently, in Louisiana, a disregard for moral norms
is acceptable as long as it is done discretely.
Like the Virginia court in Brown, the Sherman court pre-
sumed that the mother's living arrangement "must inevitably af-
fect Jonathan adversely."' 1 Again, no expert testimony was
presented to show that the child was adversely affected by his
mother's actions.
Does a parent who cohabits with a lover, faced with a cus-
tody battle, satisfy the court by terminating such a relationship?
Not necessarily. Promises to marry or to terminate the relation-
ship in order to retain custody are insufficient to some courts
when the moral climate in which children are raised is at stake.
Courts appear to require mothers to wear the scarlet letter "A"
on their chest for all eternity. An example of this position can be
found in Beck v. Beck.2 In this case, Mrs. Beck attempted to
"redeem herself by requiring her lover to move out of her trailer
and discontinuing sexual relations with him."a3 The court was
unpersuaded that the mother's change in her living arrangement
was sufficient. Relying on an earlier custody case, it explained
that: "Past misconduct forms an important consideration in de-
87. 441 So. 2d 469 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
88. Id. at 470.
89. Id. at 471.
90. 383 So. 2d 1231 (La. 1979).
91. Sherman, 441 So. 2d at 471. Recognizing facts similar to those in Bagents v.
Bagents, 419 So. 2d 460 (La. 1982), the Court stated that "the mother's disregard for the
observance of recognized moral norms, demonstrated by her living in concubinage with
Waits, is a valid criterion for determining her unsuitability as a parent." Sherman, at
471.
92. 341 So. 2d 580 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
93. Id. at 582.
1990]
25
PACE LAW REVIEW
termining the present suitability of a parent."'
Custody determinations should be based on the best inter-
est of the child. The problem with these decisions is that the
best interest of the child takes a back seat when the court disap-
proves of the life style of the parent. No longer does the court in
these cases investigate which parent would better have primary
responsibility for raising a child. Instead, the inquiry focuses on
the court's perception of which parent is the more acceptable
person morally.9 5
B. The Nexus Category
Under the nexus approach, courts that are faced with a par-
.ent who cohabits with a lover scrutinize the relationship and its
impact on the child to determine whether to modify a custody
award. Under this standard, the courts review the evidence to
determine if a parent's cohabitation does in fact adversely affect
a child's welfare, thus necessitating removal. Of the sixty-three
appellate custody cases reviewed for this survey that fall within
the nexus category, fifty-seven involved a mother who was co-
habiting, while only six involved a father who was cohabiting. In
cases involving a cohabiting father, the father was always
awarded custody. 6 As some commentators have remarked, a
double standard exists whereby "[a] body of law has emerged
which holds men and women engaged in extramarital affairs to a
double standard . . . . 9 Of the fifty-seven cases involving the
cohabiting mother, the mother was awarded custody in 58% of
the cases and the father in 42% of the cases.
Subsequent to Jarrett, the appellate court of Illinois in In
re Marriage of Olson,98 distanced itself from the holding of Jar-
rett, distinguishing the cases by whether or not the cohabitation
of the parties was "open and notorious." 99 In Olson, unlike Jar-
94. Borras v. Falgoust, 285 So. 2d 583, 588 (La. Ct. App. 1973), writ denied, 289 So.
2d 161, cert. denied sub noma, Harmon v. Falgoust, 419 U.S. 854 (1974).
95. See Lowery, The Wisdom of Solomon, Criteria for Child Custody From the Le-
gal and Clinical Points of View, 8 LAW AND HuM. BEHAV. 371, 379 (1984).
96. See infra notes 98-202 and accompanying text.
97. La Fave, Origins & Evolution Of The "Best Interests of The Child" Standard,
34 S.D.L. REV. 459, 498 (1989).
98. 98 Ill. App. 3d 316, 424 N.E.2d 386 (1981).
99. Id. at 319, 424 N.E.2d at 389; see also In re Marriage of Smith, 132 Ill. App. 3d
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rett, the mother's admitted sexual relationship never occurred
when the minor child was present, and the child was not aware
of his mother's sexual intimacy with her lover. In In re Marriage
of Cripe, °00 the appellate court of Illinois revisited the cohabita-
tion debate with a slightly different twist. In Cripe, the mother
was living in open and notorious adultery with a man, exposing
the relationship to two daughters, aged seven years and ten
months. The court distinguished Jarrett on the basis that there
was no evidence to indicate that Mrs. Jarrett's immoral or illegal
conduct would terminate in the future, while the evidence indi-
cated that Mrs. Cripe and her paramour intended to marry. 101
The court found that although Mrs. Cripe "had engaged in im-
moral or illegal conduct in the past," this "conduct was not ex-
pected to continue in the future. 10 2
Some courts assign great weight to the fact that a coha-
biting parent marries her lover. For example, in Sealy v.
Sealy,'0s the cohabiting mother married her paramour and was
awarded custody of her two children. The court agreed that re-
marriage alone was an insufficient basis for awarding her cus-
tody,' 0" however, "remarriage which restores 'moral fitness' has
been recognized as a factor to be considered in awarding change
of custody."' 0 5
The court of appeals of Virginia in Brinkley v. Brinkley,00
694, 479 N.E.2d 929 (1985) (finding no open and notorious cohabitation).
100. 183 Ill. App. 3d 37, 538 N.E.2d 1175 (1989); see also Fisher v. Fisher, 185 Neb.
469, 176 N.W.2d 667 (1970).
101. 183 Ill. App. 3d at 45, 538 N.E.2d at 1176 (changed circumstances warranting
modification of custody order include those not previously known to the court, nor dis-
coverable with reasonable diligence at time of entry of initial order).
102. Id. at 45, 538 N.E.2d at 1179; see also Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App. 3d 465,
381 N.E.2d 70 (1978). The court in Rippon held that "[o]nly when an open adulterous
relationship exists with no possibility of marriage, as when the paramour is and remains
married to another woman, is there sufficient grounds to remove custody from the
mother." 64 Ill. App. 3d at 468, 381 N.E.2d at 73.
103. 295 S.C. 281, 368 S.E.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1988).
104. Id. at 284, 368 S.E.2d at 87 (citing Fisher v. Miller, 288 S.C. 576, 344 S.E.2d
149 (1986)) (remarriage alone is insufficient to warrant a change of custody).
105. Id.; see also Stutz v. Funderburk, 272 S.C. 273, 277, 252 S.E.2d 32, 34 (1979)
(where the affair was sufficient to deprive her of custody, the mother's subsequent re-
marriage restored her moral fitness and was a strong factor supporting the restoration of
her custody rights).
106. 1 Va. App. 222, 336 S.E.2d 901 (1985).
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distinguished its decision from Brown v. Brown,10 7 on the basis
of the parties' discretion. The Brinkley court was persuaded
that Mrs'. Brinkley and her paramour were not committing adul-
tery in the house where the child resided, and thus concluded
that there was no evidence of any harmful effects to the child as
a result of the adultery.0 8 The court stated:
Evidence of adultery, without more, is an insufficient basis upon
which to find that a parent is an unfit custodian of his or her
child .... In determining a child's best interest, the extent to
which the child is exposed to an illicit relationship must be given
the 'most careful consideration' in a custody proceeding.' 0'
Courts generally appear more willing to accept a mother's
sexual relationship that is short lived. For example, in Marshall
v. Marshall,1 0 the court found the mother's brief affair insuffi-
cient to warrant removing custody of two minor children."' In
Bonette v. Bonette,"2 when asked to remove custody of a three-
year old daughter from her mother because of one instance of
adultery, the court concluded that the "admitted moral lapse of
the mother is not indicative of a continued course of conduct,"' "
and held that custody should remain with the mother.
A somewhat different situation may arise when the behavior
which gave rise to the custody dispute has terminated. Courts in
some cases have become unsympathetic to parents seeking cus-
tody modification based on past indiscretions. In Wyss v.
Wyss,"' Julia Wyss' live-in arrangement had terminated at the
time of the custody hearing and Julia had since married her
lover. In response to a challenge to her custody, the court clearly
stated "[c]hange of custody cannot properly be used as a penalty
107. 218 Va. 196, 237 S.E.2d 89 (1977).
108. 1 Va. App. at 224, 336 S.E.2d at 902.
109. Id.
110. 282 S.C. 534, 320 S.E.2d 44 (1984).
111. Id. at 540-41, 320 S.E.2d at 48.
112. 276 S.C. 653, 281 S.E.2d 790 (1981); see also Mace v. Mace, 215 Neb. 640, 341
N.W.2d 307 (1983) (where the record disclosed that the mother's live-in relationship was
of a brief duration, she was permitted to retain custody).
113. Bonette, 276 S.C. at 656, 281 S.E.2d at 791; see also Lockard v. Lockard, 193
Neb. 440, 227 N.W.2d 581 (1975) (adulterous relationship of the mother was not a con-
tinuing one and caused no harm to the children; therefore it was not determinative of
whom should be awarded custody).
114. 3 Ohio App. 3d 412, 445 N.E.2d 1153 (1982).
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for past misconduct where the misconduct is not continuing and
not shown to materially adversely affect the child. ' 115 The court
found no evidence that the children were exposed to any sexual
conduct or materially affected by the paramour relationship.116
Courts sometimes articulate a need to protect children from
harm as a reason to carefully review a parent's cohabitation. In
several cases, courts have come up empty handed when they
have searched for harm to the children as a result of such a rela-
tionship. In Wellman v. Wellman,'1 7 the court found no evi-
dence in the record to find a negative impact on the children as
a result of the mother's cohabiting with her lover.11 8 In Ritchey
v. Ritchey,"' the court saw no proof that any sexual misconduct
by the mother "adversely affected the child, nor would it have
an adverse effect on him in the future. '12 0
Some courts are unwilling to intervene by removing custody
from a parent in order to accomplish moral first aid. In Cleeton
v. Cleeton,1 21 the court refused to deprive a mother of custody of
her children as a result of evidence that her paramour occasion-
ally stayed overnight with her and her daughters.12 2 The court
described it as traumatic to consider removing these children
from their mother, stating "to change custody of these girls
would punish their mother for past behavior when there is no
proof of a detrimental effect on her daughters. An award of cus-
tody is not a tool to regulate human behavior." 2
115. Id. at 414, 445 N.E.2d at 1156.
116. Id.; see also Boatsman v. Boatsman, 697 P.2d 516 (Okla. 1984) (court held that
change of custody was not warranted where there was no evidence that the mother's
relationship was permanent or had caused an adverse impact on the child).
117. 104 Cal. App. 3d 992, 164 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1980).
118. Id. at 999, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53.
119. 208 Neb. 100, 302 N.W.2d 372 (1981).
120. Id. at 104, 302 N.W.2d at 375; see also Commonwealth ex rel Myers v. Myers,
468 Pa. 134, 360 A.2d 587 (1976) (existence of a non-marital relationship without a show-
ing that the children were adversely affected was not sufficient to take custody from the
mother). But see In re Marriage of Welbes, 327 N.W.2d 756 (Iowa 1982) (mother's living
arrangement had yet to have an adverse effect on the child, but the court nevertheless
deprived the mother of custody).
121. 383 So. 2d 1231 (La. 1979).
122. Id. at 1235-36; see also Benton v. Benton, 520 So. 2d 534, 534-35 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1988) (father was unable to meet burden of proving that mother's living arrange-
ment had a detrimental effect on the child and that transferring custody would "materi-
ally promote" the best interest of the child).
123. Cleeton, 383 So. 2d at 1236; see also Stephenson v. Stephenson, 404 So. 2d 963
1990]
29
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1
Several West Virginia cases have addressed the standard
that courts should apply in custody disputes involving a cohab-
iting parent. In Stacy v. Stacy,"4 the court required the parent
to refrain from "grossly immoral behavior .*.". ."I" In J.B. v.
A.B.,12 6 the court prohibited a parent's conduct that was "so out-
rageous, ' 11 7 and, in Bickler v. Bickler,125 it required evidence
that a parent was guilty of "gross immorality" to revoke
custody.""
Two Ohio cases have addressed a cohabiting parent in a
similar light. In Wyss v. Wyss,130 the court relied on the state's
custody statute,"'1 which examines whether the child's present
environment significantly endangers his physical health or emo-
tional development. 32 A second Ohio case, In re Burrell,15 3 re-
quired "clear and convincing" evidence to warrant state inter-
vention in custody cases. 3 4
(La. 1981) (court found no evidence to indicate that the mother's relationship with her
paramour had a detrimental effect on her daughter); Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 420 So. 2d
712, 713 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (trial judge's discretion in awarding custody to mother up-
held notwithstanding her conduct "contrary to moral standards").
124. 332 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1985).
125. Id. at 262.
126. 161 W. Va. 332, 242 S.E.2d 248 (1978). The court stated that:
Acts of sexual misconduct .. . may not be considered as evidence going to the
fitness of the mother for child custody unless her conduct is so aggravated, given
contemporary standards, that reasonable men would find that immorality, per se.
warranted a finding of unfitness because of the deleterious effect upon the child of
being raised by a mother with such a defective character.
Id. at 333, 242 S.E.2d at 251; see also Goetz v. Carpenter 367 S.E.2d 782 (W. Va. 1988)
(using substantially similar language).
127. J.B., 161 W. Va. at 345, 242 S.E.2d at 256.
128. 344 S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1986).
129. Id. at 632; see also M.S.P. v. P.E.P., 358 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1987) (acts of
sexual misconduct by a mother may not be considered in determining child custody un-
less this conduct is likely to have a deleterious effect upon the child).
130. 3 Ohio App. 3d 412, 445 N.E.2d 1153 (1982); see also supra notes 109-11 and
accompanying text.
131. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Anderson 1989).
132. 3 Ohio App. 3d at 414, 445 N.E.2d at 1156; see also Ohland v. Ohland, 141 Vt.
34, 442 A.2d 1306 (1982) (change of circumstances alone is a prerequisite for a modifica-
tion of custody order); Davis v. Davis, 422 So. 2d 680 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (although illicit
sexual activity alone is not sufficient to deprive a parent of custody, its detrimental ef-
fects on children can be considered in the determination of what is in their best
interest).
133. 58 Ohio St. 2d 37, 388 N.E.2d 738 (1979).
134. Id. at 39, 388 N.E.2d at 739; see also In re Rex, 3 Ohio App. 3d 198, 200, 444
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Enlightened courts have begun to demand proof of actual
concrete harm to justify removing children from a cohabiting
parent. In Swain v. Swain,3 6 the court of special appeals of Ma-
ryland was unwilling to "presume a harmful effect"'16 when a
parent engaged in adultery, but instead held that a chancellor
must weigh, "not the adultery itself, but only any actual harmful
effect that is supported by the evidence. 137 The mere possibility
of future harm was insufficient. In Kennedy v. Kennedy, 38 the
Supreme Court of Nebraska took a bold step by recognizing the
mother's current husband, with whom she lived for six months
prior to their eventual marriage, as having a positive effect on
the children.3 9
Unfortunately, for every case disregarding the mother's co-
habitation, a case exists emphasizing the importance and signifi-
cance of such a relationship. In Johnson v. Johnson,"' the court
identified specific harm to a four and one-half year old daughter
as a result of her mother's living with her lover. The court fo-
cused on the child's "anxiety over the situation," and the child's
loss of a relationship with her biological father, as well as the
mother's financial instability' caused by her cohabitation. In
Haak v. Haak," 2 the court was persuaded that the mother's re-
lationship with her boyfriend was harmful to the two children,
ages seven and five, because the children "were able to recognize
N.E.2d 482, 484 (1981) (court emphasized that the relevant statute required a showing of
"damage to the physical, mental, moral or emotional development of the child").
135. 43 Md. App. 622, 406 A.2d 680 (1979).
136. Id. at 629, 406 A.2d at 683; see also In re Marriage of J.A.F., 602 S.W.2d 227
(Mo. App. 1980) (court required conduct to be gross, promiscuous, open, or antisocial).
137. Swain, 43 Md. App. at 629, 406 A.2d at 684; see also Fontenot v. Fontenot, 714
P.2d 1131 (Utah 1986) (court found no evidence indicating that the children were di-
rectly exposed to or affected by their mother's sexual behavior).
138. 221 Neb. 724, 380 N.W.2d 300 (1986).
139. Id. at 726, 380 N.W.2d 302; see also supra text accompanying note 35; accord
Woodruff v. Woodruff, 418 So. 2d 775 (Miss. 1982) (court found that a five and one-half
year old child had no understanding of the significance of the mother's short affair).
140. 422 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
141. Id. But see Lisenby v. Lisenby, 419 So. 2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (find-
ing no adverse effects caused by the mother's relationship); Culpepper v. Culpepper, 408
So. 2d 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (finding no adverse effects caused by the mother
giving birth to an illegitimate child). A strong argument could be made that these exam-
ples are not directly attributable to the mother's cohabitation, but could be explained by
the parties separation.
142. 323 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1982).
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the impropriety of their mother's conduct."""3
In Shioji v. Shioji,'" the court upheld the father's custody
relying heavily on evidence that revealed the mother's living ar-
rangement caused the children "embarrassment and discomfort
in their own relationships with close family members, who
viewed defendant's conduct as immoral and repugnant." '45
The strongly worded dissent of Justice Zimmerman in the
Shioji case addressed a major factor overlooked in these deci-
sions: nearly one-quarter of the nation's families are headed by
single parents, with the result that children are becoming the
"primary casualties on the domestic battlefield. ' 14' According to
Justice Zimmerman, courts must recognize the need for stability
for children of divorce. Relying on Hogge v. Hogge,147 he advo-
cated a two-part test to be met before a custody order is modi-
fied. First, there must be a determination that a substantial and
material change of circumstances has occurred. Only after such a
finding should the trial court take the second step and deter-
mine de novo which custodial arrangement best serves the inter-
est of the child. As in Hogge, the presumption is against chang-
ing custody. There must be a finding, according to Justice
Zimmerman, of "some material relationship to and substantial
effect on parenting ability or the functioning of a presently ex-
isting custodial relationship." '"48
Justice Zimmerman recognized that discontented and jeal-
ous ex-spouses might look for any evidence that their ex-spouses
are not remaining chaste, hoping to convince a court that the
change in circumstances warrants custody modification. In his
view, to invite the relitigation of groundless claims of changed
circumstances would cause great hardship and injustice to chil-
dren of divorce who so desperately require stability.
Furthermore, Justice Zimmerman continued, it would ulti-
143. Id. at 130; see also Spaulding v. Spaulding, 278 N.W.2d 639 (S.D. 1979) (court
believed children, ages eight and seven, were old enough to be harmed by their mother's
marital misconduct).
144. 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985).
145. Id. at 200.
146. Id. at 202 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting).
147. 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982).
148. Shioji, 712 P.2d at 202 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting) (quoting Becker v. Becker,
694 P.2d 608, 610 (1984)).
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mately result in "rewarding the ex-husband who instituted this
meritless custody challenge ... encouraging more ex-spouses to
bring on baseless attempts to change custody .. ". ."" Justice
Zimmerman described the trial court's findings as "no more than
an after-the-fact attempt to rationalize the initial decision."15 0
He noted that the mother's sexual conduct was private and dis-
creet, her relationship with her boyfriend was stable and serious,
and her boyfriend had developed a positive and healthy relation-
ship with the children.151 Justice Zimmerman concluded that the
trial court's finding that the mother's relationship caused the
children embarrassment was "drawn from a blank page." ' 2
Several courts have drawn a distinction between a parent's
discreet sexual affair and one which was open and notorious. In
Matter of Marriage of Maddox, " the parties' eight year old
daughter saw her mother in bed with her boyfriend.15' According
to expert testimony, the child was emotionally damaged as a re-
sult of this lifestyle. The Maddox court distinguished its conclu-
sion from Matter of Marriage of Niedert, 5 where the mother
engaged in a discreet sexual affair which did not itself justify a
change of custody.
In Queen v. Queen," the Maryland Court of Appeals va-
cated the trial court's ruling because of its heavy reliance on the
mere existence of a sexual relationship between the husband and
a woman not his wife, and remanded for a true determination of
the best interests of the child.15 7 The trial court had failed to
assess whether or not "that relationship . . . [had resulted in]
such a harmful effect on the child as to outweigh other factors in
favor of granting custody to the father.""
149. Id. at 206-07 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 203 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 204 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting).
153. 56 Or. App. 345, 641 P.2d 665 (1982).
154. Id. at 349, 641 P.2d at 667; see also Gustafson v. Gustafson, 376 N.W.2d 290
(Minn. App. 1985) (the court relied on a state statute which provided that if the child's
present environment endangered his physical or emotional health, the harm likely to be
caused by a change of environment is outweighed by its advantages).
155. 28 Or. App. 309, 559 P.2d 515 (1977).
156. 308 Md. 574, 521 A.2d 320 (1986).
157. Id. at 589-90, 521 A.2d at 328.
158. Id. at 590, 521 A.2d at 328. In fact, the court noted that other factors to be
considered in this determination include:
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In Marlatt v. Marlatt,15  the court focused on a mother's
choosing cohabitation over the best interest of her four year old
son. As the court pointed out, the mother "substantially de-
faulted in her maternal obligations, '"1 0 putting her own interest
in her adulterous affair over her son's interest. The mother's re-
sponsibility and position as a role model was also the key ingre-
dient of the custody dispute in Hill v. Hill."' If a court believes
that a mother has disregarded this important role by choosing to
place her sexual life before the interests of her child, it can be
extremely harsh. In Medlen v. Sims,'6 2 the court found that the
the adaptability of the prospective custodian to the task, the age, sex and health
of the child, the physical, spiritual and moral well-being of the child, the environ-
ment and surroundings in which the child will be reared, the influences likely to
be exerted on child, and, if he or she is old enough to make a rational choice, the
preference of the child.
Id. at 587-88, 521 A.2d at 327 (quoting Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 357, 157 A.2d 442, 446
(1960)).
159. 427 So. 2d 1285 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
160. Id. at 1289.
161. 421 So. 2d 408 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
162. 420 So. 2d 272 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). In Bell v. Bell, the Georgia court of ap-
peals, quoting from the appellant's brief, noted the changing societal standards in the
area of extramarital relationships:
We know that in 1854, the Courts frowned upon couples living together without
the present benefit of matrimony as in the case of Lindsey v. Lindsey, 14 Ga. 657,
at page 660, we find the following judicial approval of the double standard: 'Upon
principles of abstract ethics, there may be no difference in the sin of the man and
the woman, who violate the laws of chastity. In the eye of the omniscient God, the
weak and erring woman may not be (to say the least,) the more sinful and de-
graded of the two. But we do know, that in the opinion of society, it is otherwise.
The man may notoriously sin in this regard; and yet, sometimes, retain a position
of respectability, or quasi respectability, by means of which his relations and those
of his family, with decent people, are maintained; his children may associate with
such persons, and be educated to become good and useful members of society. But
otherwise it is with the frail female; for when once she sins after this sort, she sins
against society. Easy is the descent, with her, then, to an Avernus of utter and
irremedial ruin, where her associations are with the vulgar, the vile and the de-
praved. If her children be with her, their characters must be, more or less, influ-
enced and formed by the circumstances which surround them.'
This, however, is not 1854, but is 1979. While the trial court's beliefs probably
reflect the standards of our society through the first half of this century, they
simply are no longer an accurate rule by which we may not gauge issues of moral-
ity in today's world. Among today's young adults, the defendant is conducting
herself in a manner which we believe to be generally acceptable to society.
154 Ga. App. 290, 291-92, 267 S.E.2d 894, 895-96 (1980) (emphasis in original).
The court of appeals of Georgia was unpersuaded, and upheld the 1854 Lindsey
case. Id. at 291, 267 S.E.2d at 896.
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mother had placed her entertainment and social pursuits ahead
of her regard for her two children.'
A review of cases in which fathers cohabited with women
without the benefit of marriage suggests that a double standard
can rear its ugly head when courts demand that mothers, but
not fathers, lose custody of their children when they choose to
be sexually active outside of marriage. For example, in In re
Marriage of Thompson, 64 the same court which decided Jar-
rett 6 ' awarded custody to a father who committed adultery dur-
ing his marriage, explaining that Jarrett did not establish a con-
clusive presumption that a child is harmed merely because a
custodial parent cohabits with a member of the opposite sex.'66
Considering. the circumstances, this enlightened court assigned
great weight to the healthy relationship that existed between the
father and his son in awarding the father custody. Interestingly,
the dissent in Thompson revealed some startling facts which,
were the mother cohabiting instead of the father, might have led
to a different result. For example, Justice Underwood pointed
out that in addition to the father's illicit affairs, the abduction of
his son from Mrs. Thompson, and threats to potential witnesses,
he also had two children from a former marriage, a daughter
whom he had not seen in nine years and a son whom he had
never seen. It was further observed that the father was under a
court order to pay $100 weekly for the support of these children,
had lost his job, and had instituted bankruptcy proceedings. 16 7
Were the mother to have engaged in such behavior, the court
would have undoubtedly reached an opposite conclusion.
Custody decisions lend themselves to the imposition of the
particular moral perspectives of individual judges. In Truitt v.
163. Medlen, 420 So. 2d at 273.
164. 96 Ill. 2d 67, 449 N.E.2d 88, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 895 (1983).
165. 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979).
166. Thompson, 96 Ill. 2d at 78, 449 N.E.2d at 93.
167. Id. at 80, 449 N.E.2d at 94 (Underwood, J., dissenting); see also Smith v.
Smith, 464 So. 2d 97 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (husband who engaged in sexual relations
after his divorce, sometimes in his home, did not lose custody because the court found no
substantial detriment to the child); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 475 N.E.2d 723 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985) (court permitted father to retain custody although he was living with a woman in
the same home as his six year old daughter). But cf. Carr v. Carr, 480 So. 2d 1120 (Miss.
1985) (mother who committed adultery lost custody of her children).
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Truitt,168 the Michigan court of appeals reversed and remanded
a custody dispute involving a father who permitted his girlfriend
to spend weekends with him while his daughters were present in
the home. The court ordered the rehearing of the custody matter
before a different circuit judge, due to the trial judge's "appar-
ent moral indignation."' 9 In Fort v. Fort,7 the appeals court
admonished the trial court to "avoid making moral judgments
on the life-styles of proposed custodial parents ....
Courts continue to place a great deal of weight on the moral
atmosphere of the home, although it appears to be a difficult
concept to grasp. For example, in Larson v. Larson,172 the court
noted that "[t]he moral values which Sheryl has demon-
strated '173 were injurious to the children, and thus upheld the
award of custody to the father. Following similar reasoning, the
court in Wilson v. Upell' 74 awarded a father custody to provide
a "more moral atmosphere for Amanda.' 75 The court in L. W. v.
G. W.176 similarly concluded that moral fitness is a "matter of
prime concern for the court"' 77 in awarding custody.
It is enlightening to review how courts address custody de-
terminations when both mother and father are guilty of extra-
marital affairs. Do both parents lose custody to a third party?
Does the parents' conduct balance out? In Bagents v.
Bagents,75 the father had an adulterous affair during his mar-
riage, while the mother, after her divorce, began living with a
married man. The court recognized that neither parent was a
168. 172 Mich. App. 38, 431 N.W.2d 454 (1988).
169. Id. at 47, 431 N.W.2d at 458; see also In re Marriage of J.H.M., 544 S.W.2d 582
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (court noted mother's affair had harmful effects on the children and
that mother tried to instill in the children disrespect for the father).
170. 12 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 425 N.E.2d 754 (1981).
171. Id. at 415, 425 N.E.2d at 757. But cf. Powell v. Powell, 665 S.W.2d 312 (Ky.
1984) (court stated that the question is whether the parent's misconduct is likely to ad-
versely affect the child).
172. 294 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1980).
173. Id. at 619.
174. 119 Mich. App. 16, 325 N.W.2d 611 (1982).
175. Id. at 20, 325 N.W.2d at 613.
176. 534 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
177. Id. at 829; see also T.B.G. v. C.A.G., No. 53791 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1988)
(LEXIS, States library, Mo file), rev'd on other grounds, 772 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1989).
178. 419 So. 2d 460 (La. 1982).
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"model of morality."1 9 Although the mother married her par-
amour, the court was not impressed with her claim that the
child benefitted from her previous cohabitation. 18 0 On the whole,
the court found that the father's adulterous affair with a seven-
teen year old girl, presumably outside the marital home, was less
disturbing than the mother's affair in the home. Thus, custody
of the minor child was placed with the father. " '
Nix v. Nix,8 2 another case in which both the mother and
father were involved in extramarital affairs, had a similar re-
sult.8 " The facts showed that the mother had a sexual affair
with a married man shortly before her divorce although the af-
fair terminated when the father petitioned for custody.8 " The
evidence also revealed that the father had sexual relations with
his girlfriend, although the father did not cohabit with her. The
court distinguished the behavior of the father from that of the
mother, noting that the mother's ongoing relationship was "im-
moral, failed to set a proper example for the minor children, and
resulted in harm to the children."' 8
Many court decisions are based on whether the child is ex-
posed to the parent's sexual relations. In Patterson v. Patter-
son, 8 6 although the mother and father engaged in sexual rela-
tions with individuals other than each other, there was no proof
that the sexual relationships occurred in the presence of the
children; while the court heard evidence that the mother had
sexual relations when the children were present in the house, it
discounted the effect of such behavior because the children
neither witnessed, nor we're ever aware of, such conduct. 8 7 This
enlightened opinion was written the same year that another
court, in Cole v. Cole,88 reached a similar result based on com-
179. Id. at 462.
180. Id. But see Griffin v. Griffin, 424 So. 2d 1228 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (court refers
to a "reformation rule," whereby a mother is not unfit because of an adulterous relation-
ship as long as she reforms by way of marriage or termination of the relationship).
181. Bagents, 419 So. 2d at 463.
182. 17 Ark. App. 219, 706 S.W.2d 403 (1986).
183. Id. at 220, 706 S.W.2d at 403.
184. Id. at 221, 706 S.W.2d at 404.
185. Id. at 222, 706 S.W.2d at 404.
186. 399 So. 2d 846 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980).
187. Id. at 848.
188. 274 S.C. 449, 265 S.E.2d 669 (1980).
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parable facts. The Cole decision may have hinged on the fact
that the father's adultery occurred during the parties' marriage,
while the mother's adultery was limited to the period following
the couple's legal separation. 189
A review of recent cases suggests that courts may have be-
gun to turn the corner, refusing to consider a parent unfit to
care for a child based solely on adulterous activities. For exam-
ple, in Kean v. Kean, 90 the court concluded that although both
parties had sexual relations with individuals other than their
spouses,
it is generally accepted that adultery, standing alone, does not re-
quire a change of custody .... It is only in those instances where
the moral conduct of the offending spouse is so gross, promiscu-
ous, open or coupled with other types of antisocial behavior as to
directly affect the physical, mental, economic or social well-being
of a child that a change is warranted.91
The courts of West Virginia focus on the primary caretaker
standard expressed by David M. v. Margaret M.,192 requiring ad-
herence to the state custody statute.19 3 The West Virginia courts
accept restrained normal sexual behavior and intervene only
when "the child is a party to, or is influenced by, such
behavior.' 9 4
Courts seem to breathe a sigh of relief when marriage is on
the horizon. According to some, the magic of marriage cures all
ills when moral unfitness is alleged. In Woodruff v. Woodruff, 95
where the mother married the man she had an adulterous affair
189. Id. at 453, 455, 265 S.E.2d at 671.
190. 754 S.W.2d 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
191. Id. at 925; see also Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1987) ("Moral
character is only one of a myriad of factors the court may properly consider in determin-
ing the child's best interest.").
192. 385 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1989) (quoting Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363
(1981)). The guidelines described by Garska to identify the primary caretaker are repro-
duced at text accompanying infra note 226.
193. W. VA. CoDE § 48-2-15 (Supp. 1990).
194. David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 924 (W.Va. 1989); see also J.B. v.
A.B., 161 W. Va. 332, 242 S.E.2d 248 (1978) (isolated acts of sexual misconduct are not
relevant to a mother's fitness).
195. 418 So. 2d 775 (Miss. 1982); see also Heckle v. Heckle, 266 S.C. 355, 223 S.E.2d
590 (1976) (where mother's adulterous relationship was known to the trial court, modifi-
cation of custody sought on the ground of her adulterous behavior was denied because
there was no change of circumstances).
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with one week before the custody hearing, the court declared
that her earlier behavior had no material adverse effect on the
child. The Supreme Court of South Carolina in Stutz v. Funder-
burk'96 was most impressed with the mother marrying her par-
amour, and awarded her custody of her children. Previously the
trial court had awarded custody to the child's father, based pri-
marily upon the finding that the mother was living with a man
while he was married to someone else.197 The Supreme Court of
South Carolina expressed its approval, stating: "The illicit rela-
tionship of appellant has ended through marriage ... [t]he rec-
ord abundantly supports the conclusion that the mother is now
morally fit . ... "198
The court of appeals of Arkansas also heard a custody dis-
pute involving a mother who, after living with a man under the
same roof as her five year old son and fifteen year old daughter,
married her lover as the custody petition was being filed in trial
court. 99 The court, while not condoning the parent's promiscu-
ous conduct, seemed to go out of its way to point out that the
mother's lover was an active participant in rearing the chil-
dren.2 00 This resulted in a custody award to the mother.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in Koch v. Koch201 chose
to concentrate on other factors to deny custody to a mother who
was involved in an extramarital relationship. In awarding cus-
tody to the father, the court emphasized his participation in
household chores during the marriage, washing the clothes,
bathing the child, reading to her and doing the dishes. The court
noted that he remained employed during the marriage. On the
other hand, the mother, according to the court, did not maintain
196. 272 S.C. 273, 252 S.E.2d 32 (S.C. 1979).
197. Id. at 275, 252 S.E.2d at 33; see also In re Marriage of Winn, 190 Mont. 73, 618
P.2d 870 (1980) (mother temporarily lived with a man outside of marriage but was mar-
ried when the case was heard on appeal).
198. Stutz, 272 S.C. at 276, 252 S.E.2d at 33; see also Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App..
3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70, 73 (1978) (the court, citing Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d
300 (1952), stated "[e]ven previous open adulterous conduct, once the mother has mar-
ried the paramour and reestablished a good home, is not grounds for change of
custody.").
199. Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Ark. App. 284, 288, 715 S.W.2d 281, 221 (1986); see
also Lapp v. Lapp, 336 N.W.2d 350 (N.D. 1983) (father married his lover prior to the
appellate argument of the case).
200. Anderson, 18 Ark. App. at 288, 715 S.W.2d at 221.
201. 209 Neb. 896, 312 N.W.2d 294 (1981).
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a clean home, her employment history was unstable and she ex-
pressed uncertainty about her future earnings. The court chose
to disregard the mother's extramarital affair, focusing instead on
the child's emotional relationship with her parents, the respec-
tive environment offered by both parents, and the health of the
child.2 2
It is difficult to know what the decisive factor really is in a
custody dispute. Often one must read between the lines to dis-
cover if what the court articulates as its reasons are in fact its
true reasons for making custody determinations. Perhaps when
courts are given more specific guidance as to what criteria
should be considered in custody disputes, they will refrain from
injecting their own. moral values into an already emotional
situation.
C. The Effect of Cohabitation on Visitation and Adoption
Rights
Parents seeking visitation privileges face similar problems
when they choose to cohabit with their lovers. Trial courts in
several states have prohibited visitation when a parent lives with
a lover. For example, in Robinson v. Robinson,2 0 3 an enlightened
appellate judge reversed the denial of a mother's visitation
rights based on the trial judge's "shocked conscience" at this
conduct. 0 4 The trial court in Snyder v. Snyder °5 prohibited a
father from exercising any visitation rights with his four chil-
dren, referring to him as morally bankrupt.206 The appellate
court reversed the trial court's decision, preventing this parent's
lifestyle from being the sole factor by which his or her morality
202. Id. at 899, 312 N.W.2d at 296; see also Kringel v. Kringel, 207 Neb. 241, 244,
298 N.W.2d 150, 153 (1980) (the court affirmed the award of custody to the father be-
cause he had stabilized his marital problems and his future goals; the mother had neither
resolved these problems nor determined her immediate future plans with regard to the
children).
203. 5 Va. App. 222, 361 S.E.2d 356 (1987).
204. Id. at 226, 361 S.E.2d 358 (the trial judge referred to "the light of human expe-
rience" in making his decision to restrict visitation).
205. 170 Mich. App. 801, 429 N.W.2d 234 (1988); see also Jones v. Haraway, 537 So.
2d 946 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (reversing the trial court, the appellate court held that there
was no evidence that it would be in the child's best interest to terminate overnight
visits).
206. Snyder, 170 Mich. App. at 804, 429 N.W.2d at 236.
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is judged.2 "
Cohabiting couples are also prevented from adopting chil-
dren by state statutes that specifically allow married couples or
single adults to adopt, but do not similarly permit two single
adults to jointly adopt a child.208 In Matter of Robert Paul p.,209
the New York Court of Appeals declared that the state adoption
statute should not be used as a quasi-matrimonial vehicle to
provide non-married partners with a legal imprimatur for their
sexual relationship, be that relationship heterosexual or homo-
sexual in nature.2 10 The court of appeals further suggested that
as a matter of state policy the legislature, not the courts, should
address the right of homosexual or heterosexual lovers to
adopt.211
However, several courts have begun to recognize cohabita-
tion and attach legal significance to it. For instance, in Mac-
Gregor v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,12 the court
acknowledged that the nonmarital relationship established by
the couple was sufficient to permit one member of the relation-
ship to be eligible for unemployment insurance when she termi-
nated her employment in order to follow her nonmarital partner
and biological child to another state.218 Because children benefit
greatly from being raised by two parents, perhaps state legisla-
tures will recognize and permit loving partners who choose not
to marry to qualify as adoptive parents.
207. Id. at 806, 429 N.W.2d at 237; see also Elizabeth A.S. v. Anthony M.S., 435
A.2d 721 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981) (the court reversed a lower court ruling that failed to
permit a proper evidentiary inquiry into the effect upon the child of the parent's adulter-
ous conduct during visitation).
208. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1988); IowA CODE ANN. § 600.4
(West 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-4 (1984).
209. 63 N.Y.2d 233, 471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984).
210. Id. at 236, 471 N.E.2d at 425, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
211. Id. at 239, 471 N.E.2d at 427, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 655. For a discussion of child
custody determinations where one parent is homosexual, see D. Stone, The Moral Di-
lemma; Child Custody When One Parent is a Homosexual or Lesbian: An Empirical
Study, SUFFOLK U.L. REV. (1991) (forthcoming).
212. 37 Cal. 3d 205, 689 P.2d 453, 207 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1984).
213. Id. at 207, 689 P.2d at 454, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 824. The court noted that this
decision maintained and preserved the family relationship, even though the parties were
not married.
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IV. Guidelines for Determining Child Custody
What factors do judges consider in making custody determi-
nations? Do judges need specific guidance as to what factors
they should consider in making child custody decisions? Part IV
will examine state statutes, review mandated and suggested fac-
tors, and propose a model statute to assist courts in determining
child custody.
A. Existing Guidelines for Determining Child Custody
The "tender years" doctrine, once the guiding principle in
custody litigation, has its roots in an 1830 Maryland High Court
of Chancery decision, Helms v. Franciscus 14 The Maryland
court asserted that "[tihe father is the rightful and legal guard-
ian of all his infant children; . . .Yet even a court of common
law will not go so far as to hold nature in contempt, and snatch
helpless, pulling infancy from the bosom of an affectionate
mother, and place it in the coarse hands of the father." '215 To-
day, however, the tender years doctrine has substantially lost ac-
ceptance by courts in most states.21 " In fact, the majority of
state statutes are clear in their direction to courts that the "best
interest of the child" is the guiding light for judges to follow in
custody determinations.2 17
214. 2 Bland 544 (Md. High Ct. Ch. 1830).
215. Id. at 563.
216. R. HOROWITZ & K. GERLACH, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 236 (1984).
217. Various state statutes list several factors for the court to consider in custody
decisions. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332
(1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 772 (1981); FLA.
STAT. § 61.13 (1985 & Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
para. 602 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1990); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5 -21 (1987); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-1616 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (Baldwin 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.23 (1968); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (1972); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 452.375 (1990 & Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1979); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (1989).
However, other states simply state that custody will be determined based on the
best interest or welfare of the child. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-13-101 (1987); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46b-56 (1986); IDAHO CODE § 32-1005 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17
(1983 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney Supp. 1989); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 125.480 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1987); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5303 (Pur-
don 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law Co-op 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101
(Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.002 (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15
(Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 20-2-113 (1987).
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According to a nationwide study, mothers continue to be
awarded custody of their children in a disproportionate number
of cases.218 The eighty-one attorneys surveyed reported that
courts were awarding custody exclusively to mothers in 60% of
the cases, exclusively to fathers in 26% of the cases, and joint
custody 13% of the time (see Graphs 15 and 16).
JOINT CUSTODY PREFERENCE
BY COURT
70%
65%
60%
55%
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
PREFERRED NOT PREFERRED
COURT'S PREFERENCE
OVERALL MALES E FEMALES
ATTORNEY <40 ATTORNEY >40
GRAPH 15
218. McClindon, supra note 9, at 367 (survey of divorce and custody cases during
the 1980's in New Haven, Connecticut produced data showing custody awards exclu-
sively to the mother in 86% of the cases and exclusively to the father in only 8% of the
cases). But see Atkinson, supra note 22, at 10 (review of 241 reported custody cases
decided nationwide in 1982 revealed that fathers were awarded exclusive custody in 51%
of the cases and mothers were awarded exclusive custody in 49% of the cases).
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GRAPH 16
. Many state statutes enumerate specific factors to guide
judges in awarding custody2 19 State legislators have recognized
that empowering judges to decide custody disputes based on the
vague best interest of the child standard leaves too much discre-
tion to judges while offering little guidance. Courts are, there-
fore, instructed to explore the mental and physical well-being of
the child to determine what is in the child's best interest.2 2
Moreover, a majority of state legislatures take into account the
parents' mental and physical health 221 as well as the child's pref-
219. See supra note 217.
220. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124
(1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 772 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1983); IND. CODE .§ 31-
1-11.5 -21 (1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (Baldwin 1984); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
146 (West Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.23 (1968); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375
(1990 & Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3109.04 (Anderson 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (1950).
221. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124
(1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 772 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1985 & Supp. 1990);
IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 602 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp.
1990); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5 -21 (1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (Baldwin 1984);
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erence2 2 Statutes have acknowledged the significance of identi-
fying which parent best fulfills the primary caretaker role to the
child, and to this end have placed great importance on the par-
ent-child relationship before making a custody decision.2 23
For example, the West Virginia legislature adopted a sex-
neutral custody provision.2 2 In applying the legislative directive,
the West Virginia courts have distanced themselves from a ma-
ternal preference and adopted a "primary caretaker parent"
preference. In Garska v. McCoy, 22' the court defined the pri-
mary caretaker as the parent who takes primary responsibility
for the following caring and nurturing duties:
(1) preparing and planning of meals;
(2) bathing, grooming and dressing;
(3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes;(4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians;
(5) arranging for social interaction among peers after
school... ;
(6) arranging alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day-care,
etc.;
(7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the
middle of the night, waking child in the morning;
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 146 (West Supp. 1990); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 722.23 (1968); MINN.
STAT. § 518.17 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (1990 & Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. §
40-4-212 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04
(Anderson 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (1950).
222. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332
(1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56 (1986); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 772 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1985 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §
19-9-1 (1982 & Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1985 & Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE
§ 32-717 (1983); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5 -21 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616 (1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (Baldwin 1984); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 146 (West Supp.
1990); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 722.23 (1968); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. §
452.375 (1990 & Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-
364 (1988); NEv. REV. STAT. § 125.480 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (1983 &
Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (An-
derson 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 12.77 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101 (Supp.
1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 (1989).
223. See supra notes 219-22. The attorneys surveyed agree that the courts should
investigate the existing relationship between parent and child. Attorneys have recognized
the importance of a stable environment in addition to the preference of awarding cus-
tody to the primary caretaker. D. Stone, Responses to Custody Survey.
224. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
225. 167 W. Va. 59, 278 S.E.2d 357 (1981).
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(8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and toilet
training;
(9) educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc. and,
(10) teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing and
arithmetic.2 6
The West Virginia rule is gender-neutral both in its applica-
tion and on its face.227 To apply this formula, testimony is elic-
ited from lay witnesses, including the parents themselves, teach-
ers, neighbors and relatives to determine who best fulfills the
definition of primary caretaker. The court inquires into which
parent does the lion's share of the chores. After determining who
is the primary caretaker, the court must finally determine
whether that parent is a "fit parent. '228 The court does not com-
pare the mother and father, focusing instead on whether the pri-
mary caretaker achieves a passing grade on an objective test,
dispensing with the need for experts.229 In applying this test the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that restrained
normal sexual behavior did not rise to an unfitness level, but
required an inquiry as to whether the child was a party to, or
influenced by, this behavior. 23 0
The concrete, specific guidance offered by the West Virginia
statute is thus likely to lead to a more objective and predictable
outcome in custody litigation. Unfortunately, not all state stat-
utes provide such a framework. Most judges are guided by their
own individual standards.23 As a result, a double stan-
226. Id. at 69-70, 278 S.E.2d at 363.
227. Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics
of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 168, 180 (1984). The author concedes the list of criteria
usually spells "mother."
228. To pass the test of being a fit parent, a person must:
(1) feed and clothe the child appropriately;
(2) adequately supervise the child and protect him or her from harm;
(3) provide habitable housing;
(4) avoid extreme discipline, child abuse, and other similar vices; and
(5) refrain from immoral behavior under circumstances that would affect the
child.
David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 924 (W. Va. 1989).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. J. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J.
757 (1985) (there is very little empirical data concerning the effect of the custodial par-
ent's post-divorce sexual behavior upon the child's adjustment).
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dard - excusing a father's sexual indiscretions while punishing
a mother for similar conduct - is apparent in some deci-
sions."' Some commentators have remarked that judges' indi-
vidual values are especially tested when a cohabiting parent
seeks to retain custody.2 "
Attorneys were questioned regarding what factors they be-
lieved were most likely to be considered by the courts in award-
ing custody (see Table I). Table I also lists the factors that were
actually considered by appellate courts adjudicating custody
disputes.
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA),2"' drafted
by the Special Committee on Marriage and Divorce of the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
provides a list of significant factors for judges to consider when
making custody determinations.2 8 The model guidelines recom-
mend that courts not consider the proposed custodian's conduct
when it does not affect his or her relationship with the child.23 6
The commissioners adopted the best interests of the child rule,
noting, however, that this test requires a maternal preference to
be used to tip the scales when young children are involved and
all other factors are equal.2 37
After carefully examining the responses of the attorneys to
the survey, analyzing case law and the UMDA, a model custody
statute follows.
232. La Fave, supra note 97, at 498-500.
233. Wadlington, Sexual Relations, 63 VA. L. REv. 249, 264 (1977).
234. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, 9a U.L.A. 147 (1973).
235. The recommended guidelines are:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interests;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. Id. § 402.
This act has been adopted by Arizona, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana and Washington. Colorado has adopted Parts I - IV. Id. at 147.
236. Id. § 402.
237. Id. § 402 comment.
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TABLE 1
Factors Used In Deciding Custody Cases (Percent)
Factors Attorneys3"  State39  Appellate""
Surveyed Statutes Ct. Decisions
Maintain stable
environment 53 26 23
Preference for primary
caretaker 52 26 6
Child abuse and
neglect 37 23 8
Mental and physical
health of parent
(including alcohol
and drug problems) 30 54 9
Automatic preference
for mother 17 4
Physical and mental
health of child 17 60
Child's preference 12 83 11
Interference with
visitation 12 34 3
More time available
to spend with child 12 3 5
Moral fitness (includes
non-marital heterosexual
relationships and
homosexual
relationships) 6 23 14
Relationship with
parents, sibling,
and significant
others - 66 5
238. D. Stone, Responses to Custody Survey.
239. Review of state statutes that list three or more factors. See supra note 217.
240. J. Atkinson, supra note 22, at 9-10.
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B. Proposed Guidelines for Determining Child Custody
The court, in making a custody determination, shall con-
sider the following factors:
1. The role that each parent has played, and will play, in the
upbringing and care of the child, with preference given to the
primary caretaker.
2. The ability of each parent to maintain a stable environment
and a stable and secure relationship with the child.
3. The existence of physical, sexual, or verbal child abuse or
neglect.
4. The preference of the child. This preference shall be given
significant weight when the child is 12 years of age or older,
depending on his or her intelligence and maturity.
5. The mental and emotional needs of the child.
6. The mental health of the parent, including substance abuse.
7. The moral fitness of the parent if it has a direct, present,
and causative adverse effect on child.
Regardless of the child's age, no preference should be ac-
corded either parent in a custody dispute. The separation of sib-
lings should not be contemplated without compelling reasons.
The best interest of the child should be afforded paramount
consideration.
V. Conclusion
The decision on behalf of a parent to undertake custody liti-
gation is of major importance, both in terms of the emotional
and financial investment.2 41 The importance of stability for a
child whose family is being permanently disrupted by divorce
cannot be understated. An individual's emotional development
is shaped during childhood. The way children feel about them-
selves, the nature in which they interact with others, and the
coping mechanisms they develop are all related in large measure
to their relationship with their parents. Divorce can disrupt the
delicate bond that exists between parent and child, a bond that
may or may not crack depending in significant part on the cus-
tody and visitation decision made by a judge.
241. Over half of the attorneys surveyed receive in excess of $3000 to represent a
parent in a contested custody case. See Graph 17.
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Parents who live with a lover continue to risk losing custody
of their children. Factors such as the judge's moral perspective
as well as one's geographic residence continue to dictate the out-
come of many custody decisions. Additional psychological re-
search is needed to assist courts in determining whether a co-
habiting parent's living situation is harmful to the well-being of
the child. Despite the existence of strong beliefs as to the effect
of such a situation, empirical data is lacking to assist courts in
assessing actual present or future harm to children. Until more
research is available, courts should limit their inquiry to con-
crete evidence that a parent's living situation results or does not
result in harm to the child. Future harm to the child should not
be a consideration, until the underlying cause of such harm can
be clearly identified. As states provide greater direction to the
courts regarding what factors are relevant in custody decisions
we will begin to see an end to decisions that are based on a par-
ticular judge's preconceived notions and speculation.
The proposed statute places heavy emphasis on the need to
maintain a stable and secure relationship between parent and
child. An important benchmark is the track record of the rela-
tionship between parent and child. Courts should explore the
role each parent has played and will continue to play in the care
and control of the child. The needs of the parents should be sec-
ondary to the child's paramount need for stability. Moreover,
the courts need to pay more attention to the child's preference
when the child possesses the intelligence and maturity to be ca-
pable of expressing such a preference.
Confronted with parents who choose to live with partners
without the benefit of marriage, courts possess the ability to pre-
vent the parental bond from cracking apart. Without a showing
that a parent's cohabitation has a direct and concrete adverse
effect on the child, the parents' sexual behavior should be irrele-
vant. The burden of proving an adverse effect should rest on the
parent asserting that it is harmful. Judges must understand soci-
ety's norms and values before they assume the role of protecting
them.24 Courts must squarely face the need to offer the child a
stable home. Ultimately, the more capable parent should be
awarded custody. This will be the only sure way of protecting a
child of divorce.
242. Lowery, supra note 95, at 378-79.
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Demographics
A. Age:- Sex:
B. Number of years practiced law
C. Number of attorneys in firm:
D. What specific training have you
you for representation of clients
hearings?
E. State the
you have
hearings: -
received to prepare
in child custody
names and city/state of the courts in which
represented clients in child custody
The following questions relate to the period of time from June 1,
1987, through May 31, 1988. Please limit your responses to this
time frame:
1. Number of custody cases you have handled between
6/1/87 - 5/31/88:
1-5 - 11-5 - 21-25
6-10 - 16-20 - over 25 -
2. Of the number of custody cases you have handled between
6/1/87 - 5/31/88, in what percentage of these cases did you
represent?
Mother
Father
Other Relative (please state)
Child
Other (please state)
PACE LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX
Custody Questionnaire
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3. Of the number of custody cases you have handled between
6/1/87 - 5/31/88, place a percent in each category describing the
final disposition of the case.
Settled without lawsuit filed
Settled prior to hearing
Court order
4. Of the number -of custody cases you have handled between
6/1/87 - 5/31/88, what percent of these cases were appealed to a
higher court by you _ ; by opponent
5. Of those cases appealed to a higher court, what percent were
reversed?
6. Of the number of custody cases you have handled between
6/1/87 - 5/31/88, state in percentages the outcome of the case:
A. Of those custody cases settled prior to court hearing:
Child placed with mother
Child placed with father
Joint custody award[ed] to both
parents
Child custody award[ed] to social services
agency
Child custody award[ed] to another party
(please list)
Of the custody cases involving more than one child, and
settled prior to court hearing, state in percentages the
cases in which siblings were separated from each
other
B. Of those contested custody cases that were decided by a
court, state in percentage the outcome of the case:
Child placed with mother
Child placed with father
Joint custody award[ed] to
both parents
Child custody award[ed] to social services -
agency
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Child custody award[ed to another party
(please list)
Of those decided by a court, percent in which siblings
were separated from each other
7. Custody Dispute Between Mother and Father
Often child custody cases involve serious moral issues. In your
initial interview with a client seeking your legal assistance for
the purpose of child custody litigation, what advice would you
give the client involving the following fact pattern?
I. You are contacted by a mother of a child. Mother of
child (child is of average intelligence and 5 years old) is divorced
from father of child. Child had been living with mother and fa-
ther birth to age 3. Father moved out when child was 3. Mother
awarded custody. Mother had no live-in boyfriend at that time.
Child continued living with mother. For past 6 months, mother
has a live-in boyfriend (sharing same bed). Mother and boy-
friend have no current plans to marry. What do you tell mother
of child? (I understand that courts usually consider many fac-
tors in arriving at child custody awards, and I realize you are not
privy to all the facts of both parties.) (Mark only one response
with an "X".)
(a) Get married to boyfriend
(b) Kick boyfriend out of the house
(c) Do not discuss the subject; it is none of your
business
(d) Refuse to represent mother until she marries boy-
friend or kicks him out of house
(e) Other (please explain)
II. If this case went to trial, what do you predict that the
judge you have appeared before most frequently, in the custody
cases you have handled, would do after learning of this living
arrangement, assuming other party is not involved in such a liv-
ing arrangement. (Mark only one response with an "X".)
(a) Consider mother's living arrangement as a minor fac-
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tor in determining custody award
(b) Consider mother's living arrangement as per se un-
fitness and remove child from home of mother
(c) Determine if child is adversely affected psychologi-
cally by mother's living arrangement; if so, remove
child; if not, disregard as a factor
If your judge considers child is adversely affected by
mother's living arrangement, on the average, at what age do you
believe the judge will determine that a parent's living arrange-
ment (unmarried persons of the opposite sex) does adversely af-
fect the child which warrants removal of the child?
(a) All ages
(b) Age 3 and above
(c) Age 5 and above
(d) Age 7 and above
(e) Age 10 and above
(f) Age 13 and above
(g) Age 15 and above
(h) Other, please explain
Would the sex of the child make a difference in your re-
sponses to the last three questions; if so, please explain:
III. The facts of this case are slightly altered - the father
of the child has been living with a girlfriend for the last 6
months. Father and child have been living together since child
was born. Mother moved out when child was 3. At that time,
father was not living with a girlfriend. You represent father.
Mother claims this living situation is immoral (adversely affects
child) and seeks custody. Father was awarded custody of child at
age 3, now mother is petitioning for custody claiming father's
living arrangement is adversely affecting child. What do you tell
father of child? (Mark only one response with an "X").
(a) Get married to girlfriend
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(b) Kick girlfriend out of the house
(c) Do not discuss the subject; it is none of your
business
(d) Refuse to represent father until he marries girlfriend
or kicks her out of house
(e) Other (please explain)
IV. How would the judge you have appeared before most
frequently on custody litigation rule on such a case? (Mark only
one response with an "X".)
(a) Consider father's living arrangement as a minor fac-
tor in determining custody award
(b) Consider father's living arrangement as per se unfit-
ness and remove child from home of father
(c) Determine if child is adversely affected psychologi-
cally from father's living arrangement; if so, remove
child; if not, disregard as a factor
If your judge considers child is adversely affected by father's
living arrangement, on the average, at what age do you believe
the judge will determine that a parent's living arrangement (un-
married persons living with persons of the opposite sex) does ad-
versely affect the child which warrants removal of the child?
(Mark only one response with an "X".)
(a) All ages
(b) Age 3 and above
(c) Age 5 and above
(d) Age 7 and above
(e) Age 10 and above
(f) Age 13 and above
(g) Age 15 and above
(h) Other, please explain
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Would the sex of the child make a difference in your re-
sponses to the last three questions; if so, please explain:
V. Custody dispute between mother and father. Mother of
child is divorced from father of the child. Child is of average
intelligence and 5 years of age. Child has been living with
mother and father from birth to age 3. Father moved out when
child was 3. Child continued to live with mother. Mother has a
live-in lover, another woman, sharing same bed. Mother states
that she is a lesbian and believes she is capable of caring for her
child and continuing to maintain an open homosexual relation-
ship. The child is aware that the mother is living with a woman
sharing the same bed. What do you tell mother who seeks legal
assistance for the purpose of pending custody litigation?. (Mark
only one response with an "X".)
(a) Kick woman friend out of the house
(b) Do not discuss the subject; it is none of your busi-
ness _
(c) Refuse to represent the mother unless she kicks the
woman friend out of the house
(d) Other (please explain)
VI. If this case went to trial and the presiding judge was
the judge that you have appeared before most frequently in the
custody cases you have handled, what do you believe the likely
outcome of the case will be if it goes to a hearing? The father of
the child claims this living situation is immoral and adversely
affects the child and seeks custody. Mother of the child was
awarded custody of this child when child was age 3. The child is
now age 5. The mother of the child has been living in this homo-
sexual relationship for the past six months. (Mark only one re-
sponse with an "X".)
(a) Consider mother's living relationship as a minor fac-
tor in determing custody award
(b) Consider mother's living relationship as per se unfit-
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ness and remove child from home of mother
(c) Determine if child is adversely affected psychologi-
cally from mother's living arrangement. If so (nexus)
remove child; if not, disregard as a factor
If your judge considers child is adversely affected by
mother's homosexual living arrangement, on the average, at
what age do you believe the judge will determine that a parent's
living arrangement (live-in homosexual relationship) does ad-
versely affect the child, which warrants removal of the child?
(a) All ages
(b) Age 3 and above
(c) Age 5 and above
(d) Age 7 and above
(e) Age 10 and above
(f) Age 13 and above
.(g) Age 15 and above
(h) Other, please explain
Would the sex of the child make a difference in your re-
sponses to the last three questions; if so, please explain:
VII. The facts are slightly altered - the father of the
child has been living with another man in a homosexual relation-
ship for the last six months. Father and child have been living
together since child was born. Mother moved out of house when
child was 3. Father was awarded custody. At that time, father
was not living with a man. Mother has filed for custody. You
represent father. Mother claims the living situation is immoral
and adversely affects the child and seeks custody. Father was
awarded custody of child at age 3, at which time father was not
living in a homosexual relationship. Mother is presently seeking
custody, claiming this living arrangement is immoral and ad-
versely affects the child. What do you tell father who seeks legal
assistance for the purpose of pending custody litigation? (Mark
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only one response with an "X".)
(a) Kick man friend out of the house
(b) Do not discuss the subject; it is none of your
business
(c) Refuse to represent the father unless he kicks the
man friend out of the house
(d) Other (please explain)
If your judge considers child is adversely affected by father's
homosexual living arangement, on the average at what age do
you believe the judge will determine that a parent's living ar-
rangement (live-in homosexual relationship) does adversely af-
fect the child, which warrants removal of the child?
(a) All ages
(b) Age 3 and above
(c) Age 5 and above
(d) Age 7 and above
(e) Age 10 and above
(f) Age 13 and above
(g) Age 15 and above
(h) Other, please explain
Would the sex of the child make a difference in your re-
sponses to the last three questions; if so, please explain:
8. Review of custody awards, discussions with judges and
attorneys, and reviewing of state custody statutes have helped to
identify the factors courts consider upon making custody
awards. Please read the following list of factors and select the
top three that you believe are the most significant to judges on
the custody cases you have handled in the period of time from
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6/1/87 - 5/31/88. Mark the most significant factor with a "MX"
and the two other important factors with an "S".
Automatic Preference for Mother
Preference for Primary Caretaker
More Time Available to Spend with Child - Gain
Custody
Separation of Siblings
Physical Accommodations of Parent's Home
Physical Health of Parents
Maintain Stable Environment
Provide Religious Training (church/synagogue
attendance)
Child Abuse or Neglect
Alcohol and Drug Problems of Parent
Mental Instability of Parent
Perjury and Other False Statements
Interference with Visitation
Frequent Change of Residence
Parent's Plan to Move Out of State
Nonmarital Heterosexual Relationships
Homosexual Relationships
Negative Relationships with Stepparent/Stepsiblings
Positive Relationships with Stepparent/Stepsiblings
Help from Grandparents/Relatives
Follow Child's Preference
Mental Health of Child
Physical Health of Child
Reasons for Parents' Separation
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School Adjustment of Child
Financial Abilities of Parents to Care for Child (Parent's
Employment and Income
Parents' Long-Standing Community Ties
Education of Parents
History of Visitation by Parent
9. The rules of evidence at your custody hearings were (please
mark with an "X"):
Strictly interpreted
Loosely interpreted
Nonexistent
10. Average length of child custody hearing
11. Average amount of time you have spent on each hearing
(i.e. interviewing, research, travel, telephone, and the hearing,
etc.)
12. Is joint custody preferred in courts?
13. Is a guardian ad litem appointed to represent the child in
contested custody cases? Mark an "X" for your response.
Always
Sometimes
Never
14. If your state statute provides a listing of factors a court
should consider in making child custody awards, please cite such
statute.
15. The average fee you charge a client (parent) for representa-
tion on a contested custody case which does not get appealed
$100-$500
$500-$1,000
$1,000-$1,500
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$1,500-$2,000
$2,000-$3,000
$3,000 and over
16. Any comments or suggestions
I understand that this questionnaire which I am completing
for Donald H. Stone will be used as data for his research and
scholarly writing. I give Mr. Stone permission to use direct quo-
tations from this questionnaire at his discretion. I understand
that I will retain anonymity in the writing of the article.
Date Name (please print)
Telephone Signature
Address
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